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Abstract
The search for economically e±cient policy instruments designed to promote the
di®usion of renewable energy technologies in liberalized markets has led to the in-
troduction of quota-based tradable `green' certi¯cate (TGC) schemes for renewable
power. However, there is a debate about the pros and cons of TGC, a quantity con-
trol policy, compared to guaranteed feed-in tari®s (FIT), a price control policy. In
this paper we contrast these two alternatives in terms of cost e®ectiveness and social
welfare, taking into account that electricity markets are not perfectly competitive.
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Electricity generation from renewable energy sources is increasingly recog-
nized to play an important role for the achievement of policy goals high on
the agenda, such as reductions in local pollutant and global greenhouse gas
emissions, improved diversity and security of energy supply, and exploitation
of opportunities for creating local value added and employment.
The intention of the European Commission to issue a Directive on the promo-
tion of electricity from renewables CEC (1998, 1999a,b), which eventually led
to the issuance of Directive 2001/77/EC CEC (2001), has triggered an inten-
sive debate over the pros and cons of guaranteed feed-in tari®s (FIT) versus
tradable green certi¯cate (TGC) schemes. 1 FIT provide certainty about the
achievable per unit revenues from selling renewable electricity to the grid. In
contrast, TGC are based on competitive market principles, typically featuring
mandatory quota targets and certi¯cate trading (see e.g. Menanteau et al.,
2003). While FIT have turned out to be very e®ective in countries like Aus-
tria, Denmark, Germany and Spain, a problem with guaranteeing such prices
is that market distortions increase with increasing shares of electricity gener-
ation from renewables. TGC, on the other hand, promising to enhance static
and dynamic e±ciency, have attracted considerable attention in recent years.
They have been introduced in a number of countries with liberalized electricity
markets (e.g. Rader and Norgaard, 1996; Espey, 2000; Berry, 2002; Nielsen and
Jeppesen, 2003; Lorenzoni, 2003; Verbruggen, 2004). More recently, the debate
has been revolving around the interplay between TGC markets and markets
1 In the literature TGC schemes are sometimes also referred to as Renewable Port-
folio Standards (RPS).
2for tradable CO2 permits (e.g. Morthorst, 2001), and between TGC markets
and liberalized power markets (e.g. Morthorst, 2003), respectively. Another
active strand of research concerns ¯nancial risk of investors (Lemming, 2003;
Dinica, 2006).
FIT is similar to a subsidy for suppliers of renewables, while TGC consti-
tute an internalization mechanism in the Baumol-Oates (1998) standard-price
tradition. In fact, comparisons between taxes or subsidies and quota-based
certi¯cate schemes have so far been undertaken mainly in environmental eco-
nomics, and in particular with regard to emission control. Denicolµ o (1999), for
example, analyzes the e®ects of e²uent charges and pollution permits when
innovation is expected. Based on seminal work by Weitzman (1974, 1978),
Pizer (1999a,b) studies the di®erence between a tax and quota policy under
uncertainty, ¯nding that uncertainty causes the optimal amount of emission
reduction to increase, which justi¯es preference for taxation over quantity
control. In the context of renewable energy policy-making, Madlener and Gao
(2005) assess the impact of pre-commitment of government with respect to
policy targets in the presence of cost-reducing innovation. And in an empir-
ical study, Palmer and Burtraw (2005) analyze the cost e®ectiveness of two
di®erent renewable electricity policies (TGC versus renewable energy produc-
tion tax credit) targeted at the U.S. electricity sector and their impact on
greenhouse gas emissions.
This paper is devoted to the issue of whether the di®usion of renewable elec-
tricity generating technologies can be better promoted by means of FIT or
TGC, and in particular whether one of the schemes dominates the other in
terms of cost e®ectiveness and social welfare. The answer to this question
is found to importantly depend on the structure of imperfectly competitive
3markets for power.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic models that
are used to contrast the e®ects of TGC and FIT in perfectly and imperfectly
competitive markets for power. Under perfect competition, the equivalence of
TGC and FIT is shown. This equivalence does not hold in a duopoly with
quasi-symmetric costs, as demonstrated in section 3. Section 4 contains an
evaluation of the two policies in terms of social welfare. Section 5 discusses
policy implications, and section 6 concludes.
2 Promoting renewable electricity in a perfectly competitive mar-
ket
We start with the simplest case, assuming that in a perfectly competitive
electricity market there are N ¯rms with equal electricity generation costs. In
terms of primary energy inputs used, let there be only two ways to produce
electricity, fossil/nuclear or renewables (solar, wind, hydro, biomass etc.), with
the second referred to as `green electricity'. Generation cost associated with
fossil/nuclear is assumed to be generally lower than that of green electricity.
However, green electricity has positive externalities to society not only in terms
of biophysical but also socio-economic bene¯ts (e.g. additional employment,
local value-added, new infrastructure). 2 The fact that these externalities are
not su±ciently taken into account in decisions regarding type and level of elec-
tricity production and consumption may motivate policy interventions such
as FIT and TGC.
2 Note that the use of green electricity may also lead to non-negligible negative
externalities (e.g. Abbasi and Abbasi, 2000; Tsoutsos et al., 2005).
42.1 FIT as a subsidy
The term `subsidy' here refers to a transfer paid by the government or elec-
tricity consumers to the suppliers of green electricity. Thus, producers receive
a surcharge of s per unit of green electricity. 3 Given a competitive market, a
representative generator of power faces the following optimization problem,
max
x;xg [px + (p + s)xg ¡ cx ¡ cg(xg)]; (1)
where x and xg denote the amounts of electricity produced from fossil/nuclear
fuels and renewable (`green') energy sources, respectively, c refers to per unit
cost of electricity produced from fossil/nuclear fuel (assumed to be constant
for simplicity), cg(xg) is the cost function for green electricity, and p is the
spot market price for electricity.
For an interior solution, the f.o.c. are





g] = 0: (3)
Inserting (2) into (3), we ¯nd that in an optimum with x > 0 and xg > 0,
the government subsidy s (or negative tax) has to be equal to the (absolute)
di®erence between c0
g[x¤
g], i.e. the marginal cost of green electricity evaluated
at the optimum, and c. The economic intuition behind this result is that if s >
(c0
g[x¤
g]¡c), all generators will supply green electricity only; if s < (c0
g[x¤
g]¡c),
then no green electricity at all will be provided.
3 In reality it is usually the power fed into the grid that counts, which due to on-site
electricity consumption and transmission losses may be considerably less than gross
production. This di®erence is neglected for simplicity.
52.2 TGC as a quota-based policy
Rather than subsidizing green electricity, the government can also impose a
quota of green power on each generator. 4 If a generator falls short of the
quota, it faces a ¯ne that increases with the shortfall. For each unit of green
electricity produced, the generator obtains a certi¯cate, providing proof of
partial satisfaction of the norm.
Initially, assume that certi¯cates are non-tradable. This assumption is nat-
ural given the assumption of identical costs (no opportunity for trading). In
section 3, the non-tradability assumption will be relaxed and a market for
certi¯cates introduced. Then, the following objective function applies to a
generator,
max
x;xg [p(x + xg) ¡ f ¢ (¹ xg ¡ xg) ¡ cx ¡ cg(xg)]; (4)
where ¹ xg denotes the green electricity quota, f is the ¯ne per unit of shortfall
from the norm, and p;x;xg;c;cg are the same as before. The f.o.c. read





g] = 0: (6)
Note the similarity of (6) and (3). In fact the ¯ne f plays the same role as the
subsidy s, which therefore represents the shadow price of the quota. 5 In an
optimum, the unit price of the certi¯cate should be equal to (slightly lower
than) the value of the ¯ne per unit.
4 Note that in practice it is often the wholesalers or retailers, and sometimes even
the ¯nal consumers of electricity, that are obliged to ful¯l the quota.
5 f can be viewed as a Lagrangian multiplier for the (inequality) constraint xg ¸ ¹ xg.
62.3 Equivalence of FIT and TGC given identical costs
To show the equivalence of FIT and TGC, i.e. subsidy and quota-based poli-






p(s)ds ¡ c(Q ¡ Nxg) ¡ Ncg(xg) + D(Nxg); (7)
where Q = N(x + xg) stands for total electricity output, p(s) for the inverse
demand function, and D(Nxg) for the monetary value of the avoided negative
and achieved positive externalities associated with green electricity produc-
tion. As f.o.c. one obtains








g] = 0; (9)
which determine the social optimum values of Q¤ and x¤
g. Eq. (9) simply
says that optimal aggregate output of green electricity must be such that the
di®erence between the marginal cost and the marginal external bene¯t of green
electricity is equal to the price-cost margin of conventional power. If these
quantities are known, the quota can be set as ¹ xg = x¤
g. The optimal subsidy
level is given by s¤ = (c0
g[x¤




It is obvious that, given the subsidy and quota levels are set according to the
optimal values determined by maximizing the social welfare, they will lead
6 Seminal work on the equivalence of price and quantity control was provided by
Bhagwati (1969) in the context of foreign trade (tari®s vs. quotas) and by Weitzman
(1974) in the context of pollutant emission control (taxes vs. quotas), respectively.
7Quantity
Price











of green power s
*
Fig. 1. Equivalence of subsidy and quota-based policy under equal costs.
to the same level of green electricity production and yield equivalent welfare
results. In this sense and given our assumptions, the subsidy system and quota
system are equivalent. Figure 1 illustrates the basic intuition behind these
results. Let S+ denote the supply schedule that re°ects the fact that green




g being the outcome of supply S0 based on private
(marginal) cost and demand D. Clearly, the e±cient quantity of green power
can be attained by paying the (optimal) subsidy s¤ or imposing the (optimal)
standard ¹ x¤
g.
3 Duopoly market and quasi-symmetric costs
Studying the problem as a duopoly game under quasi-symmetric costs can be
justi¯ed as follows. First, a perfectly competitive market as assumed in the
basic model does not well describe a market for power dominated by a few
8major players. For example, EdF still has a monopoly in France, PowerGen
has a market share of about 22% in the UK, while the ¯rst four suppliers
in Germany, RWE, E.ON Energie, Vattenfall Europe, and EnBW together
control some 80% of the market (cf. Bower et al., 2001; Matthes et al., 2005).
Second, assuming the production costs of green power to be the same for all
producers is not compatible with certi¯cate trading. Therefore, we extend the
basic model to the case of heterogeneous production costs in order to derive
the potential for trade of green certi¯cates.
Assume there are two generators in the market, 1 and 2, that have identical
technology and hence cost function in using fossil/nuclear fuel but di®erent
costs of generating renewable electricity. This is why the ¯rms are `quasi-
symmetric'. There are many reasons to expect heterogeneous cost structures
for green power, such as di®erent operational use of di®erent technologies, and
use of di®erent vintages of a given technology. After all, green power is not
yet a mature technology like fossil or nuclear, where competition presumably
has forced operators to adopt the least-cost alternative. To keep our model
simple and avoid multiple equilibria, we assume c, c1g and c2g to be constant,
where the latter two symbols refer to the per-unit costs of green power of
generators 1 and 2, respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume that
c1g > c2g. With some loss of generality (but considerable gain in simplicity),
let the demand function take on the following form,
p(x1;x1g;x2;x2g) = a ¡ x1 ¡ x1g ¡ x2 ¡ x2g; a > 0; (10)
which implies that consumers' willingness to pay is the same for fossil/nuclear
and green power.
We start with the subsidy policy, focussing on the Cournot solution because
9power markets have been characterized by an absence of the ¯erce price com-
petition one would expect in a Bertrand world. This may have been the re-
sult of collusion (Newbery, 2002), a variant of which is to stick to Cournot
strategies. Moreover, under certain circumstances (e.g., capacity constraints),
Cournot strategies continue to be pursued even under Bertrand-type compe-
tition (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983).
3.1 E®ect of subsidy on equilibrium
In this section, we assume that the subsidy is uniform, failing to take the
di®erence in cost into account; the case of a non-uniform subsidy is discussed
in section 3.2 below. Here, the two ¯rms face the following decision problem,
max
xi;xig
[(a ¡ xi ¡ xig ¡ xj ¡ xjg)(xi + xig) + sxig ¡ cxi ¡ cigxig]; (11)
where i;j = 1;2, and i 6= j.
We assume that the subsidy is exogenous to and equal across ¯rms. General-
izing condition (3), one can distinguish four di®erent cases.
3.1.1 Case 1: s < (c2g ¡ c) < (c1g ¡ c)
If s < (c2g¡c), it is obvious that no green electricity will be produced because
the subsidy does not make up for the e±cient producer's cost disadvantage.
The standard Cournot solution to the game accordingly is (cf. Kreps, 1990,
Ch.10, p.326),




x1g = x2g = 0: (13)
103.1.2 Case 2: (c2g ¡ c) · s < (c1g ¡ c)
In this case, the subsidy makes up for the cost disadvantage of green power
for generator 2, but fails to do so for the less e±cient generator 1, who there-
fore refrains from producing green electricity. The Cournot solution remains
the same (in the sense that total electricity output of each ¯rm remains un-
changed), as compared to the case of a uniform quota.
If s = (c2g ¡ c), then generator 2 is indi®erent between producing green elec-
tricity and fossil/nuclear electricity. The solution now is,




x1g = 0: (15)
On the other hand, if s > (c2g ¡ c), then generator 2 switches to green elec-
tricity, i.e.,




x1g = x2 = 0: (17)
3.1.3 Case 3: s ¸ (c1g ¡ c)
If s > (c1g ¡ c), then the subsidy overcompensates the cost disadvantage of
green power even for the less e±cient generator no. 1. Therefore, both ¯rms
produce green electricity only. Accordingly, the optimal solutions are now




x1 = x2 = 0: (19)
11In the limiting case where s = (c1g ¡ c), generator 1 is indi®erent between
producing green and fossil/nuclear power, while generator 2, being e±cient in
the production of green power, supplies green electricity only. Consequently,
the solution is




x2 = 0: (21)
3.1.4 Optimal subsidy level
The results derived in the previous subsection show that the equilibrium so-
lutions to the Cournot game strongly depend upon the level of the subsidy.
This raises the issue of determining the optimal subsidy level. In analogy to





p(s)ds ¡ c(Q ¡ xg) ¡ cgxg + D(xg); (22)
with W j denoting the social welfare gains associated with case j (j = 1, 2, and
3) of section 3.1.3. We assume that in case 2 s is slightly greater than (c2g¡c),
and in case 3 slightly greater than (c1g ¡ c), in order to avoid ambiguity.
To facilitate comparisons between the cases, the externality function associ-
ated with green electricity takes the form
D(xg) = ¯xg; ¯ > 0: (23)
The parameter ¯ (called `welfare parameter' henceforth) implies a constant
marginal social bene¯t from producing green electricity. Using the equilibrium



































As is to be expected, whether or not the welfare parameter ¯ exceeds the
marginal cost parameters is of crucial importance. Speci¯cally,
(A) if ¯ > (c1g ¡ c), then W 3 > W 2 > W 1. Hence the optimal subsidy is the
lower bound of the subsidy interval in case 3, i.e., s¤
A = (c1g ¡ c).
(B) if ¯ = (c1g¡c), then W 3 = W 2 > W 1. The welfare gains remain the same
for s¤
B = (c1g ¡c) and s¤¤
B = (c2g ¡c), though the amounts of green electricity
produced are di®erent.
(C) if (c2g ¡ c) · ¯ < (c1g ¡ c), then W 2 > W 3 and W 2 ¸ W 1. The optimal
subsidy is thus the lower bound of the subsidy interval in case 2, i.e., s¤
C =
(c2g ¡ c).
(D) if ¯ < (c2g ¡ c), then W 1 > W 2 > W 3. Therefore, the optimal subsidy is
zero, because none of the rates are e®ective in promoting green power. Figure 2
summarizes the optimal subsidy schedule for di®erent values of ¯.
3.2 Quota-based policy




[a ¡ xi ¡ xig ¡ xj ¡ xjg)(xi + xig) ¡ f(¹ xg ¡ xig) ¡ cxi ¡ cigxig]; (27)
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Fig. 2. Optimal subsidy levels vs welfare parameter of green electricity.
In the above model, each ¯rm has two choice variables. However, given the
assumptions that marginal costs are constant and di®er such that c1g > c2g,
generator 1's choice of x1g boils down to a choice between 0 and ¹ xg. If it is in
the interest of generator 1 to purchase green electricity certi¯cates at all, it
must also be (at least weakly) in its interest to go all the way. Therefore, we
can ¯nd a Nash equilibrium by comparing the ¯rms' payo®s for x¤
1g = f0; ¹ xgg.
3.3 Nash equilibrium under the quota-based policy
In the following, we elaborate the Nash equilibrium for the quota-based policy,
by comparing the ¯rms' payo®s under the two strategies stated at the end of
section 3.2.
3.3.1 Case (a): x¤
1g = 0
Given that x¤
1g = 0, then generator 2 is required to produce at least 2¹ xg units
of green electricity in order to satisfy the industry quota. The pro¯t functions
14¦i are therefore given by
¦1 = (a ¡ x1 ¡ x2 ¡ x2g)x1 ¡ cx1 ¡ f¹ xg (28)
and
¦2 = (a ¡ x1 ¡ x2 ¡ x2g)(x2 + x2g) ¡ f(¹ xg ¡ x2g)
¡ ¸(x2g ¡ 2¹ xg) ¡ cx2 ¡ c2gx2g;
(29)
where ¸ is a Lagrangian multiplier.
The f.o.c. for generator 1 is given by
a ¡ 2x1 ¡ x2 ¡ x2g ¡ c = 0; (30)
while the f.o.c. for ¯rm 2 are
a¡x1 ¡ 2x2 ¡ 2x2g ¡ c = 0 (31)
a¡x1 ¡ 2x2 ¡ 2x2g ¡ c2g + f + ¸ = 0: (32)











Eq. (33) simply says that the two ¯rms will produce the same total quantity
of electricity, determined by the maximum possible market demand and the
cost of producing electricity from fossil/nuclear fuel. From (31) and (32) we
obtain
¸ = c2g ¡ c ¡ f: (34)
Eq. (34) indicates that if (c2g ¡c) > f, such that ¸ > 0, generator 2 will only
15produce green electricity up to the industry quota as required by our assump-
tions, due to the Kuhn{Tucker condition. Note that trading of certi¯cates is
also possible as long as (c1g ¡ c) ¸ f. However, if (c2g ¡ c) = f (and hence
¸ = 0), generator 2 has an incentive to produce at least the quota required
from the industry. Also note that given constant marginal costs, di®erent val-
ues of f 2 [c2g¡c;c1g¡c] only a®ect the distribution of pro¯ts between the two
¯rms, with no impact on the amount of certi¯cate trading and social welfare.
Therefore, we ¯rst focus on the case (c2g ¡ c) = f as a benchmark.
The optimal quota continues to be determined as in eqs. (7){(9), except that
cg(xg) = c2g. Hence ¹ xg = x¤
g=2 still holds. As long as 2¹ xg · (a ¡ c)=3 [see
eq. (33)], generator 2 produces (a ¡ c)=3 ¡ 2¹ xg units of electricity using fos-
sil/nuclear fuel and 2¹ xg units of green electricity. As to 2¹ xg > (a¡c)=3, recall
that a denotes the willingness to pay for the ¯rst kWh of electricity, and c
symbolizes the (constant) marginal cost of fossil/nuclear power, which makes
(a ¡ c) a very large number. It is unlikely for ¹ xg to exceed one sixth of that
number, justifying this case to be neglected.
So far, we have assumed that generator 1 is the only buyer of generator 2's
extra certi¯cates. However, there may be another agent willing to purchase
the certi¯cates at the market price, for example, an environmental protection
agency or a foundation promoting renewable energy. Since the equilibrium
price of certi¯cates is determined in such a manner that generator 2 is indif-
ferent between producing green or fossil/nuclear fuel electricity, the presence of
an additional bidder might cause generator 2 to produce more green electricity
than the required quota. However, this would make the system a combination
of quantity and price policies because these extra purchases, resulting in an in-
crease of the value of the certi¯cates, can be viewed as a subsidy. It is possible
16that such a policy mix is more e®ective in promoting green power than either
one of the two policy instruments individually. However, a detailed analysis of
such a mixed policy is beyond the scope of this paper.
3.3.2 Case (b): x1g = ¹ xg
We now turn to the case of generator 1 producing green electricity to satisfy
the quota. With no external agent purchasing, the condition x1g = ¹ xg or
x2g = ¹ xg continues to hold. The ¯rms' optimization problem thus reads,
max
xi;xig
¦1 = (a ¡ x1 ¡ x2 ¡ 2¹ xg)(x1 + ¹ xg) ¡ cx1 ¡ c1g¹ xg (35)
max
xi;xig
¦2 = (a ¡ x1 ¡ x2 ¡ 2¹ xg)(x2 + ¹ xg) ¡ cx2 ¡ c2g¹ xg: (36)






a ¡ 3¹ xg ¡ c
3
: (37)
Notice that, in equilibrium, total electricity production of each generator is the
same as in case (a) of section 3.3.1. Also, the total amount of green electricity
available on the market remains the same. However, the two ¯rms now produce
di®erent amounts of green electricity, depending on the strategy chosen by
generator 1, viz. do not produce green electricity but purchase certi¯cates
from generator 2, or generate green electricity up to the quota. This choice of
course in°uences the decision of generator 2.
3.3.3 Comparison of cases (a) and (b)
We want to ¯nd the Nash equilibria associated with cases (a) and (b). Note
that the players take the green power quota as pre-determined. The results
17are presented below.
Case I: The ¯rms' pro¯t functions are described in (28) and (29), and the








2g ¡ c); (38)








2g ¡ c): (39)
Case II: The ¯rms' pro¯t functions are described in (35) and (36), respec-
tively, and the optimal values for x1 and x2 are derived in (37). The pro¯t of








1g ¡ c): (40)








2g ¡ c): (41)
Given c1g > c2g, comparison of (38) and (40) shows that generator 1 makes
more pro¯t in case I and hence prefers its strategy associated with case (b).
In contrast, generator 2 is indi®erent between the results associated with the
two cases. This is simply because in case I, the price of certi¯cates generator 2
receives by selling certi¯cates to generator 1 exactly compensates it for the
additional costs that arise from producing green electricity in excess of its own
quota. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium solution to this duopoly game is the
same as the solution in case I. That is, generator 1 produces no green elec-
tricity but purchases certi¯cates from generator 2, and generator 2 produces
18double the amount of green electricity required by the quota, selling the excess
over the quota to generator 1. In equilibrium, both ¯rms' total production of
electricity and their revenues are the same, and no ¯rm has an incentive to
deviate from the equilibrium once achieved.
These results are predicated on the assumption f = (c2g ¡ c). As pointed out
above, values of f 2 [c2g¡c;c1g¡c] would not change the Cournot solution and
hence leave social welfare una®ected. For example, if (c1g ¡c) > f > (c2g ¡c),
then generator 2 makes more pro¯t in case I than in case II, and 1 still makes
more pro¯t in case I than in case II, but the amount of pro¯t will be less than
the amount de¯ned in (38). Thus, it is the distribution of pro¯ts that depends
upon the level of the ¯ne set by the government.
Since total electricity production is determined for each ¯rm as shown in
eq. (33), the choices of total output amount to choices of green electricity
output. Therefore, the solutions derived above can also be shown in normal
form (see table 1).
In sum, we have demonstrated that in a duopolistic market for power, the two
¯rms may have an interest in certi¯cate trading, which results in a welfare
gain for society if it occurs. Evidently, this result may depend on assumptions
concerning demand and cost functions but not on the number of ¯rms, which
could be more than two.
6 In this case generator 1 has to pay a ¯ne which is equal to (or slightly higher
than) the price of the certi¯cate.
19Table 1










9 ¡ ¹ xg(c1g ¡ c),
(a¡c)2
9 ¡ ¹ xg(c1g ¡ c),
(a¡c)2
9 ¡ ¹ xg(c2g ¡ c) a (a¡c)2
9 ¡ ¹ xg(c2g ¡ c)
2¹ xg
(a¡c)2
9 ¡ ¹ xg(c1g ¡ c),
(a¡c)2
9 ¡ ¹ xg(c1g ¡ c),
(a¡c)2
9 ¡ ¹ xg(c2g ¡ c)
(a¡c)2
9 ¡ 2¹ xg(c2g ¡ c)
a Note that in this outcome generator 1 has to pay a ¯ne that equals (or is slightly
higher than) the certi¯cate price.
4 Welfare comparison between subsidy and quota-based policies
In spite of the simplifying assumptions made in the previous section, a com-
parison of a price/subsidy policy with its quantity quota alternative may be
worthwhile because it promises to provide some guidance to policy-makers
regarding the choice of instruments for promoting renewable energy use.
204.1 Welfare gains given the subsidy scheme
Since our main interest is to discuss how to e±ciently promote green power,
case 1 (section 3.1.1) can be disregarded since it is fossil/nuclear only. In
addition, case 3 (section 3.1.3) is not realistic because it predicts that all
¯rms exclusively produce green power, which would presuppose extremely
high green electricity quota. Therefore, we only examine the case associated
with condition (c2g ¡ c) · ¯ < (c1g ¡ c), i.e. case 2 of section 3.1.2. The















where Q continues to be the total production of both types of electricity.
Derivation shows Q¤
s = 2(a ¡ c)=3 to be the socially optimal quantity.
4.2 Welfare gains given the quota-based policy
Provided marginal costs and marginal externalities of green power are con-
stant, the optimal quota cannot be identi¯ed directly. To match the produc-
tion of green electricity in the subsidy case, we simply assume that ¹ xg is equal
to (a ¡ c)=6, which may constitute a rather frequent solution, see the discus-
sion below eq. (34) in section 3.3.1. The welfare function for the quota-based
















q = 2(a¡c)=3 = Q¤
s. These values are identical with those of section 4.1
above.
214.3 Equivalence of subsidy and quota-based policies in a quasi-symmetric
duopoly
It is obvious that Ws = Wq. This result implies that even with imperfect
competition and quasi-heterogeneous costs, subsidies may still be equivalent
to tradable certi¯cates. Because certi¯cates with trading dominate certi¯cates
without trading, subsidies are also preferable over a pure quantity system.
Therefore, this model suggests that if a market for certi¯cates does not exist
or takes time to become operational, subsidies may be the preferred solution.
Although our results con¯rm the equivalence of price and quantity instru-
ments in the context of internalization of externalities given imperfectly com-
petitive markets, the simplifying assumptions made should be kept in mind.
For example, the cost of administering subsidies and/or quota are neglected
in our study. However, when it comes to start-up costs, a certi¯cate system
may require more resources than a subsidy system, especially for establishing
appropriate regulation and regulatory control.
The crucial assumption made throughout, however, is that of perfect infor-
mation regarding both the marginal costs and bene¯ts of green power. And
with cost heterogeneity, the amount of information required for calculating the
optimal subsidy typically increases with a growing number of ¯rms. Although
the setting of the optimal quota requires similar information, the heterogene-
ity of ¯rms does not enter their determination, causing it to be relatively
straightforward and hence probably less costly than a subsidy system.
On the other hand, we found that subsidies provide more incentives for green
power precisely when its marginal social bene¯ts are high (as in case 3 of
22section 3.1.3). A pure quota-based system lacks this feature.
5 Policy implications
Based on several models incorporating imperfect competitiveness of markets
for power, we ¯nd that subsidy and quota-based approaches usually lead to
the same social welfare gains when operated at their socially optimal values.
However, the subsidy policy is generally preferred by electricity producers,
likely because it does not call into question their right to cause a certain
amount of pollution when using fossil/nuclear as input. At the same time,
subsidies do provide stronger incentives for technical innovation than quota
because they directly favor production of green electricity. Since the future
of the green electricity industry is, at least partly, dependent on future tech-
nological progress in order to lower its cost of production, subsidies are also
more e±cient dynamically.
On the other hand, subsidies require tax revenue to ¯nance them. When the
(economic or political) cost of additional taxation is high (like in the United
States, but also the Scandinavian countries e.g.), quota may provide an alter-
native. As could be expected in the presence of heterogeneous costs, tradable
certi¯cates turn out to be preferable to non-tradable ones. Because the cost
structure of green electricity typically di®ers between ¯rms (which is much
less likely of fossil/nuclear operators, who use the same mature technology to
minimize cost), tradable certi¯cates clearly constitute the preferred option if a
quota policy is chosen for political reasons. Moreover, since the cost of running
a market for certi¯cates will decrease once established, the operational advan-
tage of the subsidy policy will gradually wane, though its dynamic e±ciency
23advantage in terms of promoting innovation may persist.
6 Conclusions
This paper starts from the notion that the conventional wisdom concerning the
equivalence of a tax/subsidy and a quota/certi¯cate scheme in terms of static
e±ciency may not hold if markets for power are imperfectly competitive. Intro-
ducing a duopoly model in which the two competitors di®er in terms of their
marginal cost of producing `green' power, we ¯nd that the two schemes gen-
erally continue to be equivalent in terms of social welfare, but non-equivalent
in terms of their incentives for innovation. The basic recommendation is to
rely on the more targeted subsidies. If the quota system is preferred due to
notably a high marginal cost of taxation to generate the ¯nance for a subsidy,
then tradable certi¯cates clearly dominate non-tradable ones in view of the
heterogeneity of cost between the producers of green power. However, because
both alternatives have their advantages and disadvantages, a mix of the two
may prove to be more e±cient, a possibility deserving further investigation.
As always, actual policy choice is likely to depend not only on economic but
also on political considerations.
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